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BUSINESS-ANTITRUST LAWS-EFFECT UPON

A SUBSEQUENT ANTITRUST SuIT OF FCC APPROVAL oF AN Ex-

STATIONS-United States v. Radio Corporation of America-Creation of independent regulatory agencies presented the courts with the problem of allocating jurisdiction whenever the determination of proper judicial action was
found to require the resolution of issues which an administrative
agency was competent to resolve. To meet this problem the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" was developed whereby administrative issues are to be decided by the agency prior to the court's
determination of issues not within the realm of the agency. Application of the doctrine is based on the need for efficient and uniform agency regulation and the desirability of utilizing agency
expertise in regard to issues beyond the conventional experience
of judges. Such application is guided by a determination of oftenelusive legislative intent. Where appropriate, agency determinations will be conclusive in subsequent judicial proceedings as to
matters within the scope of the agency's power regardless of
whether the issue was brought to the agency initially1 or whether
it was referred to the agency under the primary jurisdiction doctrine.2 It is not surprising that "50 years of constant litigation have
failed to formulate the doctrine in a manner which enables
litigants to choose the proper forum with a reasonable degree
of certainty." 3
The problems in regard to the applicability of primary jurisdiction in antitrust suits involve the additional requirement of
harmonizing the antitrust laws with a regulatory statute which in
large measure is meant to provide a substitute for competition.
This harmonizing may range from complete applicability of the
antitrust laws to supercession of the antitrust remedies by remedies
provided under the regulatory statute, or to a complete antitrust
exemption. In the recent case of United States v. Radio Corporation of America,4 the United States Supreme Court held that a deCHANGE OF TELEVISION

1 D. L. Piazza Co. v. West Coast Line, Inc., (2d Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 947; Black River
Valley Broadcasts, Inc. v. McNich, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 235. See comment, 58
CoL. L. REv. 673 at 698 (1958).
2 United States v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., (D.C. Del. 1951) 101 F. Supp. 1008.
3 Comment, 25 UNIV. CHI. L. REv. 192 (1957).
4 79 S. Ct. 457 (1959). The decision was unanimous, with Justices Frankfurter and
Douglas taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case.
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termination by the Federal Communications Commission that
there was no antitrust violation connected with a requested license
transfer would not be conclusive in a subsequent antitrust suit
against one of the parties to the transfer since the FCC has no
power to determine antitrust issues as such. The Court also held
that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not operate to exempt
the transfer from the applicability of the antitrust laws.

I
On May 16, 1955, National Broadcasting Co. (a wholly owned
subsidiary of the Radio Corporation of America) and Westinghouse Broadcasting Co. entered into a written agreement under
which Westinghouse would acquire the television and radio broadcasting facilities of NBC in Cleveland plus $3,000,000 and NBC
would acquire the television and radio broadcasting facilities of
Westinghouse in Philadelphia. Applications for FCC approval of
the exchange were filed on June 15, 1955. The FCC notified the
Justice Department on August 12, 1955 of the applications and
that possible antitrust questions were raised by the applications.5
The FCC issued letters on October 17, 1955 pursuant to section
309(b) of the Communications Act6 requesting additional information on various issues including the antitrust questions, and received answers furnishing detailed data. The FCC also conducted
an extensive investigation and analysis of its own in regard to the
proposed exchange. The Justice Department stipulated in the
antitrust action that the FCC had before it all of the evidence relating to the antitrust issues, that it had a duty to, and did, consider
whether the evidence showed any violation of the antitrust laws,
and that it decided all issues relating to the exchange which it
could lawfully decide. The FCC granted the exchange applications
on December 21, 1955 without having held a hearing on the applications.7 The parties effected the exchange on January 26, 1956.8
The Justice Department also stipulated in the antitrust suit that

5 H. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary,
84th Cong., 2d sess., part I, vol. I, p. 19 (1956).
6 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(b).
7 Public Notice 27067 (1955), 13 PIKE AND FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION 374 (1956).
8 This was after the expiration of the 30-day period in which an appeal could have
been taken from the approval of the commission. 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952)
§402.
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it had been kept fully informed as to the evidence in the FCC's
possession relating to the exchange9 and that the department had
the right to request that the applications be set for a hearing under
section 309(b) of the Communications Act, 10 to request reconsideration of the FCC decision under section 405,11 to protest the decision under section 309(c),12 and to obtain judicial review of the
decision under section 402(b).13 The department exercised none
of these rights.
The Department of Justice filed a civil antitrust complaint on
December 4, 1956 under section 4 of the Sherman Act14 charging
RCA and NBC with violations of section 1 of the Sherman Act.15
Prior to the exchange, NBC owned five VHF (very high frequency)
television stations, the maximum allowable, 16 three of which were
in the nation's three largest markets. The complaint charged a
conspiracy between RCA and NBC whereby NBC was to dispose
of its two stations in the smaller markets and to acquire two stations within at least the eight largest markets; that NBC was to
utilize its power to withhold network affiliation in order to induce
station owners to exchange their stations; and that NBC threatened to discontinue Westinghouse's NBC network affiliations in
both Boston and Philadelphia, to refuse affiliation for a station
Westinghouse was acquiring in Pittsburgh, and to refuse affiliation
for any stations which Westinghouse might acquire in the future.17 The complaint charged that thereafter NBC and Westinghouse entered into a contract providing for the ·exchange subsequently approved. The Department of Justice requested that the
court hold the conspiracy or combination and the exchange agreement illegal, require divestiture of the Philadelphia station, re-

9 The stipulation is reprinted in appellee's brief as Appendix B. Also see H. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong.,
2d sess., part 2, vol. 1, p. 3181 (1956).
10 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(b).
11 48 Stat. 1095 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §405.
12 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(c).
13 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §402(b).
14 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §4.
llS 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1.
16 47 C.F.R. (1958) §3.636.
17 It is perhaps relevant to note that Westinghouse had paid $8.5 million in 1953
to acquire the Philadelphia station, the largest single station sale up to that time, and
that $5 million of this figure was paid for the NBC-TV affiliation contract. H. Hearings
before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d
sess., part 2, vol. 1, p. 3117 (1956).
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voke the station license, grant injunctive relief, and require judicial approval of further acquisitions by NBC of any television
station in the eight primary markets. 18 A preliminary hearing was
held pursuant to rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure19 to determine the validity of the defendants' affirmative defenses. The district court held that the affirmative defenses were
valid and a bar to the suit,20 stating that it lacked jurisdiction since
the exclusive means for review of an order of the FCC is by appeal
to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit under
section 402 of the Communications Act; 21 that if it had jurisdiction it could not exercise it since the commission decided that the
exchange did not violate the antitrust laws; 22 and that the suit
should be dismissed because of the equitable doctrine of laches.23
An appeal was taken directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act of 1903, as amended.24

II
In reversing the district court on the ground that the FCC has
no power to determine antitrust issues as such in a license proceeding and that such issues were meant to be subject to judicial
scrutiny even after approval by the FCC, the Supreme Court relied
heavily upon the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927 which
preceded the Communications Act of 1934. Section 313 of the
Communications Act specifically declares the antitrust laws to be
applicable to "interstate or foreign radio communications,"25 and

18 Appellant's brief, p. 10.
Rule 12(b), Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 28 U.S.C. (1952).
States v. Radio Corporation of America and National Broadcasting Co.,
(E.D. Pa. 1958) 158 F. Supp. 333, noted and criticized in 71 HARv. L. REv. 1558 (1958);
44 VA. L. REv. 457 (1958).
21 158 F. Supp. 333 at 334.
22 Id. at 335.
23 Id. at 336.
24 32 Stat. 823 (1903), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §29.
25 "All laws of the United States relating to unlawful restraints and monopolies and
to combinations, contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade are hereby declared to
be applicable to the manufacture and sale of and to trade in radio apparatus and devices
entering into or affecting interstate or foreign commerce and to interstate or foreign
radio communications, Whenever in any suit, action, or proceeding, civil or criminal,
brought under the provisions of any of said laws or in any proceedings brought to enforce
or to review findings and orders of the Federal Trade Commission or other governmental
agency in respect of any matters as to which said Commission or other governmental
agency is by law authorized to act, any licensee shall be found guilty of the violation of
the provisions of such laws or any of them, the court, in addition to the penalties imposed
19

20 United
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section 311 directs the commission to refuse a license to any person "whose license has been revoked by a court under §313."26
These provisions were taken from the Radio Act of 192727
and seem to have originated in a prior bill in which what is now
section 311 appeared as the third paragraph of section 2(C) and
what is now section 313 appeared as section 2(G).28 In the hearings
on this bill, it was stated that the Secretary of Commerce29 would
have no discretion to refuse a license under section 2(C) to a party
believed to be violating the antitrust laws since this was a judicial
question and not within the discretion of the sec:retary. 30 Upon
its subsequent reintroduction, a minority report on the bill stated
that section 2(C) might be wholly ineffective since it did not prohibit or guard against "the issuance or renewal of licenses to parties unlawfully monopolizing or attempting to unlawfully monopolize radio communication, etc., unless and until such party
shall have been found guilty thereof by a Federal Court." 31 This
report proposed that a commission be established which would
hold hearings to determine whether the applicant is violating the
antitrust laws and, if it is so determined, that the Secretary of

by said Jaws, may adjudge, order, and/or decree that the license of such licensee shaH,
as of the date of the decree or judgment becomes finany effective or as of such other
date as the said decree shaH fix, be revoked and that an rights under such license shall
thereupon cease: Provided, however, That such licensee sha)] have the same right of
appeal or review as is provided by Jaw in respect of other decrees and judgments of said
court." 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §313.
26 "The Commission is directed to refuse a station license and/or the permit here•
inafter required for the construction of a station to any person (or to any person directly
or indirectly controHed by such person) whose license has been revoked by a court under
section 313 of this title." 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §3ll.
27 H. Rep. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 47, 49 (1934).
28 H.R. 5589, 69th Cong., 1st sess. (1925). Section 2(G) was identical to the present
§313. The third paragraph of §2(C) stated: "The Secretary of Commerce is hereby directed
to refuse a station license and/or permit hereinafter required for the construction of a
station to any person, firm, company, or corporation, or any subsidiary thereof, which
has been found guilty by any Federal court of unlawfully monopolizing or attempting
to unlawfully monopolize radio communication, directly or indirectly, ·through the control
of the manufacture or sale of radio apparatus, through exclusive traffic arrangements, or
by any other means. The granting of a license shall not estop the United States or any
person aggrieved from prosecuting such person, firm, company, or corporation for a
violation of the Jaw against unlawful restraint and monopolies and/or combinations,
contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade."
20 A large part of the administration of the act, as then phrased, was to be by the
Secretary of Commerce.
30 H. Hearings on H.R. 5589, 69th Cong., 1st sess., p. 27 (1925).
31 H. Rep. 404, 69th Cong., 1st sess., p. 16 (1926).
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Commerce shall then refuse to grant the license.32 During the
Senate consideration of a version of the bill, it was stated that "the
bill does not attempt to· make the commission the judge as to
whether or not certain conditions constitute a monopoly; it rather
leaves that to the court." 33 Congress adjourned prior to action on
the bill but the next session reported out a version which became
the Radio Act of 1927.34 These two sections were subsequently
incorporated into the Communications Act of 1934 as sections 311
and 313.35 Section 311, as enacted, contained a sentence stating,
"The granting of a license shall not estop the United States or any
person aggrieved from proceeding against such person for violating
the [antitrust laws]. ..." 36 This sentence was repealed in 1952,37

32 Id. at p. 23. Likewise, the House defeated an amendment which was attempted
to be inserted when the bill reached the floor and which would •have required that a
license .be refused to any person "found by any Federal court or the Commission to have
been unlawfully monopolizing or attempting to unlawfully monopolize" radio communication. 67 CoNG. R.Ec. 5502, 5555 (1926).
33 67 CONG. R.Ec. 12507 (1926).
34 44 Stat. 1162 (1927).
35 H. Rep. 1918, 73d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 47, 49 (1934).
36 "The Commission is hereby directed to refuse a station license and/or the permit
hereinafter required for the construction of a station to any person (or to any person
directly or indirectly controlled by such person) whose Hcense has been revoked by a
court under section 313, and is hereby authorized to refuse such station license and/or
permit to any other person (or to any person directly or indirectly controlled by such
person) which has been finally adjudged guilty by a Federal court of unlawfully monopolizing or attempting unlawfully to monopolize, radio communication, directly or
indirectly, -through the control of the manufacture or sale of radio apparatus, through
exclusive traffic arrangements, or by any other means, or 'lo have been using unfair
methods of competition. The granting of a license shall not estop the United States or
any person aggrieved from proceeding against such person for violating the law against
unfair methods of competition or for a violation of ·the law against unlawful restraints
and monopolies and/or combinations, contracts, or agreements in restraint of trade, or
from instituting proceedings for the dissolution of such corporation." 48 Stat. 1086 (1934).
This section was ,based upon §13 of the Radio Act [and §2(C) of the earlier bills]
"modified to leave the Commission discretion in refusing licenses where the applicant has
been adjudged by a court to be guilty of a violation of the antitrust laws but where the
judgment !has not extended to the revocation of the existing licenses." H. Rep. 1918, 73d
Cong., 2d sess., p. 49 (1934).
37 66 Stat. 716 (1952). The 1952 amendment repealed both the above-mentioned
sentence and the portion of the previous sentence giving the commission discretion to
refuse licenses to an applicant previously adjudged by a court to ·be violating the antitrust
laws when the court did not order such revocation. The evolution of this section has
thus been from a mandatory refusal of a license to a person found guilty by a court of
violating the antitrust laws (note 28 supra), to a discretionary refusal (note 36 supra), to
a refusal only when the person's license has been revoked by a court (note 26 supra).
The 1952 amendment would seem to indicate a congressional intent .that the FCC have
no control over either the determination of antitrust violations or the granting of relief
for court-determined antitrust violations. See S. Rep. 44, 82d Cong., 1st sess., p. 9 (1951).
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but the Conference Committee stated, "It is the view of the members of the conference committee that the last sentence of the present section 311 is surplusage and that by omitting it from the
present law the power of the United States or of any private person to proceed under the antitrust laws would not be curtailed or
affected in any way." 38 Although the omitted sentence could arguably have been intended to apply only to antitrust violations
subsequent to the license grant,39 the Court appears correct in its
view that such a restrictive interpretation would not seem natural
in light of other legislative history.40
Apart from the legislative history, the FCC has disavowed
a power to determine antitrust issues as such,41 and this position had previously been approved by the Supreme Court.42 Indeed, in approving the exchange in the principal case, the commission acted under the express assumption that this approval
would not foreclose subsequent antitrust suits by other government agencies.43
Commission approval of the exchange necessarily meant that
the "public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
thereby." 44 Antitrust issues can be considered by the commission
in determining the public interest,45 but the determination must
be based on the commission's own judgment on matters within its
special competence and not merely upon a national policy favoring
competition.46 An applicant's competitive practices, however, may

38

H. Rep. 2426, 82d Cong., 2d sess., p. 19 (1952).

39 The district court opinion in the principal case, 158 F.
40 Principal case at 464.
41 FCC Report on Chain Broadcasting 83 (1941); Report

Supp. 333 at 335.

on Uniform Policy as to
Violation .by Applicants of Laws of United States, FCC Docket No. 9572, 1 PIKE AND
FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION, Part III, 91:495 (1950).
42 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 at 223 (1943).
43 13 PIKE AND FISCHER, RADIO REGULATION 374 (1956). Commissioner Bartley dissented
from the approval of the exchange. He favored a hearing since he felt that the approval
might foreclose any effective action being taken under certain provisions of the Clayton
Act (viz., 15 U.S.C. §18). He did not seem to fear that future action under the Sherman
Act would be barred. Commissioner Doerfer wrote a rebuttal, Commissioner Mack concurring, in which he stated, at p. 382, "It is difficult to see how approval of this exchange
may effectively preclude other governmental agencies from examining into this or any
other transaction of the network Companies." See also H. Hearings before the Antitrust
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., part 2, vol. I,
p. 3181 (1956).
44 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §3IO(b).
45 National Broadcasting Co., Inc. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
46 Federal Communications Commission v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86
(1953).
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be such as to impair the applicant's ability to serve the public and
cause him to fall short of the public interest standard even though
the practices do not amount to a violation of the antitrust .laws.47
Although antitrust considerations are but one factor in determining the "public interest," it seems clear that section 3 I 3,48 in specifically making the antitrust laws applicable to the broadcasting industry, would prohibit the commission from granting a license
whenever the commission concluded that the license application
was an essential part of an antitrust violation. Conversely, whenever the commission approves a license or exchange application, it
would seem that the commission must necessarily have concluded,
on the basis of the facts before it, that the application is not part
of an antitrust violation. In accord with this view, it would appear
that the commission found that NBC's activities were a legitimate
use of a superior bargaining position and did not constitute an
antitrust violation.49 The commission has exclusive jurisdiction
to determine the "public interest, convenience, and necessity" in
connection with an application for a license50 or exchange51 and,
unless reversed on appeal, this determination will be conclusive.52
Since a commission determination that an applicant meets the
public interest standard will be given conclusive effect, a paradox
seems to exist. Such a determination necessarily requires that the
commission has found the application not a part of an antitrust
violation. Yet the principal case holds that the determination as to
the antitrust issue will not be given conclusive effect even though
all the facts relevant to such issue were considered by the commis-

47 Mansfield Journal Co. v. Federal Communications Commission, (D.C. Cir 1950)
180 F. (2d) 28.
48 48 Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §313.
49 "In the instant case there is no scintilla of evidence that NBC conspired with
anyone to monopolize production of network or local programs. No price fixing for
advertisers is remotely apparent. NBC exercised its superior bargaining position to exchange a smaller market station (Cleveland) for a larger one (Philadelphia).
"No suggestion is made that NBC is attempting to keep other net1vorks out of the
Philadelphia market or any other market. Nor that it has conspired with anyone to keep
independent broadcasters out of the markets under consideration. Even Westinghouse is
free to re-enter ·the Philadelphia market •with another network company or as an independent, if it be so advised. No restraint of trade, or attempt to monopolize television
services in any of the trading areas involved are discernible in this exchange transaction."
Statement by Commissioner Doerfer, Commissioner Mack concurring, 13 Pnrn AND FISCHER,
RADIO REGULATION 376 at 381, 382 (1956).
50 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309(a).
5148 Stat. 1086 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §310(b).
52 Black River Valley Broadcasts, Inc. v. McNich, (D.C. Cir. 1938) 101 F. (2d) 235.
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sion. Nevertheless, there is a satisfactory explanation for this result. The congressional intent as evidenced by legislative history
showed a design to withhold from the FCC any power to determine antitrust issues as such and to keep within the courts the
jurisdiction to pass on such issues. Moreover, as previously indicated, the FCC has disavowed any power or desire to pass on antitrust issues as such and this policy had been approved by the
Supreme Court.53 The FCC determination of the public interest
in connection with a license application is not an adversary
proceeding and need not involve a hearing, 54 and the commission is not expressly required to notify the Justice Department
that antitrust issues have been raised in a license or exchange
application proceeding. 55 In addition intervention and appeal
by the Justice Department could only result in a denial of the
application,56 requiring further antitrust relief to be sought
elsewhere. Thus, when viewed as a practical matter, the holding in the principal case that the FCC has no power to decide
antitrust questions seems wholly proper, any logical paradox
notwithstanding.

III
Although it could not decide antitrust issues as such, the commission would still be able to foreclose subsequent antitrust suits
if the doctrine of "primary jurisdiction" operated to exempt approved activities from the operation of the antitrust laws. The
Communications Act itself seems clearly to deny the power to exempt approved license exchange transactions from the applicability of the antitrust laws. 57 Sections 221 and 222 58 affirmatively
authorize the FCC to approve consolidations or mergers of telephone and telegraph companies and specify that the approved
consolidations or mergers will not be subject to the antitrust laws,

53 National Broadcasting Co. v. United
54 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47

States, 319 U.S. 190 at 223 (1943).
U.S.C. (1952) §309(b).

55 Ibid.
56 48 Stat. 1093 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §402.
57 In fact, appellees stated in their brief, at p. 20, that "they do not now contend,
and they never have contended, that the FCC had the power to authorize the transfer
if it violated the antitrust laws or to authorize NBC to operate the stations in violation
of the antitrust laws."
5848 Stat. 1080 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §22l(a), 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47 U.S.C. (1952)
§222(c).
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while section 313 59 makes the antitrust laws applicable to "interstate or foreign radio communications." Furthermore, section
222(c) 60 requires a public hearing and notice to the Attorney General, among others, prior to commission approval and section 221
(a) 61 contains similar safeguards, whereas sections 309 and 31062
require neither a hearing nor notice to the Attorney General prior
to commission approval of an exchange application. Had Congress
intended the approval of license or exchange applications to exempt the approved transactions from the application of the antitrust laws it presumably would have explicitly so provided and
would have included the procedural safeguards of sections 221
and 222'. In deciding that primary jurisdiction did not apply to
exempt the approved exchange, however, the Court in the principal case relied primarily upon the type of regulatory scheme provided by the Communications Act rather than upon legislative
history or a comparison of the terms of sections 221 and 222 with
sections 310 and 313.63
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction originated in the case of
Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.64 A shipper
claimed that a carrier rate, duly filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission, was unreasonable and sued in a state court to
recover the excess. The Supreme Court held that the court action
would not lie since the purpose of the Interstate Commerce Act
was to abolish preferences and discriminations by establishing uniform published rates and the power of a court to revise a published
rate would destroy this uniformity and "render the enforcement
of the act impossible." 65 Despite the fact that the act itself provided
that it did not "in any way abridge or alter the remedies now

59 48

Stat. 1087 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §313.
60 57 Stat. 5 (1943), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §222(c).
6148 Stat. 1080 (1934), 47 U.S.C. (1952) §22l(a).
62 48 Stat. 1085 (1934), as amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §309; 48 Stat. 1086 (1934), as
amended, 47 U.S.C. (1952) §310.
63 Justice Harlan concurred in the result but not in the discussion of primary jurisdiction since :he felt that the legislative history showed that "a Commission determination
of 'public interest, convenience, and necessity' cannot either constitute a binding adjudication upon any of the antitrust issues that may be involved in the Commission proceeding
or serve to exempt a licensee pro tanto from the antitrust laws, and that these considerations alone are dispositive of this appeal." Principal case at 468.
64 204 U.S. 426 (1907). As to <the development of the primary jurisdiction doctrine, see
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 664-673 (1951); Jaffe, "Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The
Anti-Trust Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REV. 577 (1954).
65 Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 at 441 (1907).
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existing at common law or by statute," 66 the Court, although admitting that the action lay at common law, nevertheless held that
the "act cannot be held to destroy itself." 67 Professor Davis has
said that this result was "obviously judicial legislation but the
reasons the court gave to justify its holdings were powerful
ones." 68 Subsequent to the Abilene case it was held that while an
attack on the tariff as unreasonable had to be decided by the commission, 69 an attack on the discriminatory application of the tariff
could be resolved by the courts as a question of law.70 In Texas and
Pacific Ry. Co. v. American Tie Co. 71 the Court held in a damage
action that whether oak railroad ties were "lumber" under a tariff
for "lumber" was a question which the ICC alone could resolve.
In Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co.,12 however,
the Court limited the agency's power to interpret a tariff to the
situation where the words of the tariff were allegedly used in a
special sense, since the construction of a tariff presents only a
question of law when "the words of a written instrument are used
in their ordinary meaning." 73 Agency interpretation is then not
necessary since uniformity as to a question of law can be secured
by action of the Supreme Court. The Court stated that the question of reasonableness, as in Abilene, was solely for the agency.
This was said to be true not only because of the necessary uniformity but also because the "determination is reached ordinarily
upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with many intricate facts of
transportation is indispensable; and such acquaintance is commonly to be found in a body of experts." 74 The Court also relied
on the expertise factor as a justification for its distinction between

66 24 Stat. 387 (1887), 49 U.S.C. (1952) §22.
67 Texas and Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426 at 446 (1907).
6BDAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 665 (1951). Chief Justice Taft, in a eulogy address,
called Chief Justice White's opinions in the Abilene case and the cases which followed
it " •.• a conspicuous instance of his unusual and remarkable power and facility in
statesmanlike interpretation of statute law." 257 U.S. xxv (1922). Cf. Convisser, "Primary
Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalizations," 65 YALE L. J. 315 (1956).
69 Robinson v. Baltimore and Ohio Ry. Co., 222 U.S. 506 (1912).
70 Pennsylvania Ry. Co. v. International Coal Mining Co., 230 U.S. 184 (1913).
71234 U.S. 138 (1914).
72 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
73 Id. at 291. Cf. United States v. Western Pacific Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956), note
55 MICH. L. REv. 864 (1957). See also COOPER, ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES AND THE COURTS
319 (1951).
74 Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants Elevator Co., 259 U.S. 285 at 291 (1922).
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ordinary and peculiar words. 75 Thus the necessity of uniform regulation and the advantages of utilizing agency expertise emerged
as the two factors justifying the application of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction.7_6
The application of primary jurisdiction in antitrust suits
presents the additional problem of harmonizing the agency's application of the regulatory statute with the court's application of
the antitrust laws.77 In Keogh v. Chicago & N. W. Ry.,78 a shipper sued for damages alleging a conspiracy to fix rates. The Court
dismissed the suit since the rates had been approved by the ICC
and a recovery of damages would offend the requirement of uniformity. The Court held that the remedy under the antitrust
laws had been superseded by the remedies provided under the
Interstate Commerce Act. 79 In United States Navigation Co. v.
Cunard S.S. Co.,80 a shipping company sued to enjoin an alleged
conspiracy violating the antitrust laws by maintaining dual rates
not filed with and approved by the Shipping Board, but the Supreme Court dismissed on the ground that the Shipping Board
had jurisdiction over the alleged practices. In Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,81 Georgia was allowed to maintain a bill to enjoin
an alleged conspiracy to fix rates even though the rates had been
approved by the ICC since the ICC did not have jurisdiction
either to approve cooperative rate filing or to give relief against
it. 82 The Court held that an injunction, unlike a damage recovery, would not interfere with the regulatory scheme. In Far East

75 Id. at 292. See comment, 25 UNIV. Cm. L. REV. 192 (1957).
76 Justice Frankfurter has described primary jurisdiction as " ••• a principle, now
firmly established, that in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experience of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative discretion, agencies
created by Congress for regulating the subject matter should not be passed over. This
is so even though the facts after they have been appraised by specialized competence
serve as a premise for legal consequences to be judicially defined." Far East Conference
v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 at 574 (1952).
77 See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE To STUDY THE
ANTITRUST LAWS 278-293 (1955); Jaffe, "Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust
Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 577 at 592-604 (1954); von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws
and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction," 67 HARV. L. REV. 929
(1954).
78260 U.S. 156 (1922).
79 Id. at 162.
80 284 U.S. 474 (1932).
81 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
82 Id. at 455, 460.
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Conference v. United States,83 the allegations of the government
were almost the same as those in Cunard and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was applied against the government's bill84 to
enjoin a dual rate system which had not been filed with the Maritime Board. 85 The Court held that if the Maritime Board refused
to immunize the rate agreement in question, an antitrust suit
could then be brought.86
When the same set of facts would give rise to both a violation
of the antitrust laws and of a regulatory statute, the availability
of the antitrust remedy will depend upon the congressional intent in fashioning remedies under the regulatory statute. If the
agency can give adequate relief the agency remedy will then be
held to supersede the antitrust remedy. 87 Where the agency cannot give relief against the alleged activity, primary jurisdiction
will nevertheless apply if utilization of agency expertise is
thought advisable or if the agency may be able to bar antitrust
action by approving the challenged activities. The application of
primary jurisdiction may thus require a plaintiff to prove his
case before an agency which can not give him relief, before he
can apply to a court for relief. 88 This should result only where
sa 342 U.S. 570 (1952).
84 Prior to the Far East case it had been thought that primary jurisdiction would
not be applied to bar a bill for an injunction sought by the government. See Jaffe,
"Primary Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 577
at 595 (1954); von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine
of Primary Jurisdiction,'' 67 HARV. L. REv. 929 at 940, 941 (1954); comment, 64 HARv.
L. REv. 1154 (1951).
85 The dissenting justices in the Far •East case felt that primary jurisdiction should
not be applicable to permit retroactive exemption where the defendants failed to pursue
the statutory procedure for securing the antitrust exemption. Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570 at 578-579 (1952). See also Staff Report to Subcommittee No. 5
of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., "Judicial Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction as Applied in Antitrust Suits" 30, 31 (1956); comment, 58 CoL. L.
REv. 673 at 692 (1958). But see von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws and Regulated In•
dustries: The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction," 67 HARv. L. REv. 929 at 958-960 (1954).
86 Far "East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 at 577 (1952). If the Maritime
Board does approve the rate agreement, an appeal can then be taken as to whether the
Shipping Act authorized the approval of the questioned rates. Federal Maritime Board
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958), note 57 MICH. L. REv. 605 (1959). See also comment, 58 COL. L. REv. 1069 (1958).
87 United States Navigation Co. v. Cunard Steamship Co., 284 U.S. 474 at 485 (1932).
See REPORT OF THE ATIORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITIEE To STUDY THE ANTITRUST
LAWS 281-282 (1955); comment, 58 COL. L. REV. 674 at 681 (1958).
88 See Convisser, "Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and its Rationalization," 65 YALE
L. J. 315 at 335 (1956); Schwartz, "Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and the Exhaustion of Litigants," 41 GEO. L. J. 495 (1953); Schwartz, "A Decade of Administrative Law:
1942-1951,'' 51 MICH. L. R.Ev. 775 at 828-831 (1953).
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initial court relief would upset a uniform rate system or where
the utilization of agency expertise or the requirements of effective regulation clearly outweigh the disadvantages placed upon
the plaintiff. In utilizing primary jurisdiction to harmonize the
antitrust laws and the regulatory statute, the courts must avoid
both an abdication of their responsibility to enforce the antitrust
laws89 and an overzealous application of antitrust laws in areas
where the competitive standard has been replaced by regulation.90 The necessity of resort to the agency because of the requirements of effective regulation will thus be largely dependent
upon the comprehensiveness of the regulatory system in question.
In the principal case the Court held that effective regulation
did not require that the FCC be able to exempt the activity in
question from the antitrust laws. Primary jurisdiction was not
justified since there were no rate structures which could be upset by the antitrust suit and, rather than being comprehensively
regulated, the field of broadcasting is one of free competition.91
Prior to the principal case it had been thought that dictum in
Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Broadcasting
Co. 92 might authorize the FCC to exempt challenged transactions'
previously approved by the commission.93 This decision by the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed an order denying a motion for a preliminary injunction and was based on the
principle that such orders are discretionary. The court said that
there was a lack of persuasive evidence of a violation and mentioned that the commission had "sanctioned" many of the terms
of the affiliation contracts in question. 94 It appears, however, that
the court was not implying that the commission could exempt

89 See Schwartz, "Legal Restriction of Competition in the Regulated Industries: An
Abdication of Judicial Responsibility," 67 HARv. L. REv. 436 (1954); Jaffe, "Primary
Jurisdiction Reconsidered. The Antitrust Laws," 102 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 577 at 603 (1954).
90 Von Mehren, "The Antitrust Laws and Regulated Industries: The Doctrine of
Primary Jurisdiction," 67 HARV. L. REV. 929 at 953-958 (1954).
91 FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
92 (2d Cir. 1948) 167 F. (2d) 349, cert. den. 335 U.S. 821 (1948).
93 See H. Hearings before the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess., part 2, vol. I, pp. 3111-3112 (1956); Staff Report to
Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,
"Judicial Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction as Applied in Antitrust Suits" 28 (1956); comment, 44 VA. L. REV. 1131 (1958).
94 Federal Broadcasting System, Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., (2d Cir. 1948)
167 F. (2d) 349 at 352, cert. den. 335 U.S. 821 (1948).
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such contracts from the impact of the antitrust laws but looked
upon the commission approval merely as further evidence to
justify denial of the temporary injunction.

IV
The decision in the principal case declares for the first time
that FCC approval under its "public interest" standard will not
exempt approved transactions from subsequent attack under the
antitrust laws even though the commission has considered all evidence bearing on the antitrust question and necessarily concluded that there was no antitrust violation. The Court also refused to expand the possibility of antitrust exemptions under the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction beyond cases involving rate
structures or industries subject to comprehensive regulation. It
is likely that the impact of the principal case will not be limited
to the television industry. Although the natural gas industry is
more extensively regulated, this case may directly affect pipeline
construction and operation which is subject to the approval of
the Federal Power Commission.95
The decision of the Court seems eminently proper.96 It is true
that much inconvenience is caused to the parties by suit being
brought almost a year after consummation of a transaction involving millions of dollars and vast changes in facilities and personnel. But as the Court pointed out, 97 any business judgment as
to the desirability of a contemplated transaction must take into
account possible infringement of the antitrust laws. The decision made by the parties in the principal case differed from decisions made by completely unregulated concerns only in that
they had to obtain the approval of the commission. No coercion
by the commission was involved. Even after approval, they could
complete the exchange or not, solely upon the basis of sound
business judgment. Since the scope of the agency approval is limited to the "public interest, convenience, and necessity," any
reliance upon such approval as a shield against subsequent anti-

95 See 52 Stat. 824
96 The Court also

(1938), as amended, 15 U.S.C. (1952) §717f(c).
pointed out .that the other contentions of ,the appellees fell of
their own weight. There could be no estoppel or !aches since ·the antitrust issue was not
before the commission, and the government did not ihave a duty to intervene in the FCC
proceedings or to seek review of the license grant. Principal case at 468.
97 Principal case at 467.
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trust suits is clearly misplaced.98 Nevertheless, it is clear that
after a careful consideration of all the evidence, the commission
found no antitrust violation. Although such a determination has
now been held not binding, it should be given substantial evidentiary weight in a subsequent judicial determination of antitrust issues.
John F. Powell, S.Ed.

98 In fairness to RCA and NBC, the failure of the Justice Department to intervene
when FCC approval was sought provided the parties with at least some basis for acting
in reliance on the commission's order without •fear of committing an illegal act. The
principal case now warns that such reliance is unfounded.

